

DISTILLING STAKEHOLDER INPUT FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION PRIORITY SETTING

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Abstract: As few organizations have enough resources that they can pursue all evaluation questions of interest, the setting of priorities for evaluative work is a critical corporate function. Ideally, evaluation resources should be focused on studies that will most effectively advance the organization by pointing to potential for improved strategy or programming. Identifying what should be studied, and when, requires that the organization have clear feedback from stakeholders on program issues. However, ongoing input from stakeholders may be so filtered that it cannot effectively fuel the setting of evaluation priorities. An expert panel that has high credibility both within and without the organization, yet is at arms length to both the organization and external stakeholders, can bypass many communications filters and thus provide the organization with a distilled but clear reading of stakeholder concerns.

Résumé: Peu d'organismes ont assez de ressources qu'ils peuvent poursuivre toutes les questions d'évaluation d'intérêt. L'identification des priorités pour le travail évaluatif est une fonction critique d'une corporation. Théoriquement, des ressources doivent être concentrées sur les études qui avanceront l'organisation en indiquant le potentiel pour l'amélioration de stratégie ou de la programmation. L'identification de ce qui devrait être étudié, et quand, exige que l'organisation reçoive de la rétroaction claire des intervenants sur des questions de programme. Cependant, la filtration des communications entre les intervenants et l'organisation peuvent empêcher sa capacité d'alimenter efficacement l'établissement de priorités d'évaluation. Un équipe d'experts ayant un crédibilité élevé dans l'organisation et dans la communauté des utilisateurs, mais indépendant, peut sauter des filtres de transmissions et fournir à l'organisation une lecture distillée et claire des soucis des intervenants.

SETTING PRIORITIES FOR EVALUATIVE WORK

Few organizations have the resources to conduct all the studies that could potentially lead to improvement of performance through modifications to existing policies, programs, or structures. A capacity to effectively set priorities for evaluative work is thus a critical corporate need. In one approach to setting priorities for evaluative work, once espoused by the Canadian federal administration (Treasury Board, 1981), managers in an organization schedule the review of all program activities over a pre-defined period. Officials establish the priority for study of each program component using pre-established criteria that might include: the amount of funding involved in the program or programs, the time and political sensitivity of program issues, the relative difficulty of addressing these issues, and the length of time since the program was last reviewed. The review of a set of program components might thus appear early in the study schedule if it involved large expenditures, bore upon politically or time-sensitive issues, was relatively easy to investigate and had not been reviewed for many years. If a program involved moderate expenditures and was of relatively low political sensitivity and difficult to evaluate, its review might be best set toward the end of the schedule.

Systematic evaluation of all programs or activities over a fixed period of time may work well for some organizations. For example, Motuz (1992) reports positively about an application of a fixed schedule approach to the programs of Agriculture Canada. Motuz makes the point that having a given program on the evaluation agenda does not necessarily imply that an evaluation will be done. The implication is only that the need for evaluative work will be carefully considered. Further, having a schedule in place helps ensure that the necessary evaluation resources will be on hand. In addition, a schedule of regular review of all programs helps alleviate concerns of program managers. Knowing that evaluative work is more or less routine, they need not view their program as being singled out for special attention when the time for review arrives.

The idea of systematically reviewing all program components over a fixed period is superficially appealing, particularly for organizations which have the resources for intensive, ongoing evaluative work. Eventually, every program falls subject to critical review, thus providing stakeholders with assurance that every expenditure or regulation has been scrutinized. In practice, however, it can mean

that some program components that really did not warrant review may be examined. Unnecessary studies, perhaps with predictable findings, are a liability if they instill a belief among senior managers that the results of evaluative work are generally tedious, boring, and irrelevant. Such beliefs may be further reinforced when, five or six years after a program has been studied, a new evaluation cycle begins, and a minor program once again comes up for review. More recent advice from the Canadian federal Treasury Board on the issue of evaluation planning (Treasury Board, 1995) suggests that the frequency and depth of review afforded individual programs should be at the discretion of the deputy head of an organization.

PEOPLE SET AN ORGANIZATION'S EVALUATION PRIORITIES

Patton (1996, pp. 47–50) lists 42 references in support of what he calls “evaluation’s premier lesson,” the idea that it is people, not organizations, who determine whether or not evaluation results get used. A reasonable corollary of the premier lesson is that it is people, not organizations, who set priorities for evaluative work. This article takes the position that individuals within an organization may have a restricted capacity to receive and hear feedback from stakeholders and thus may be handicapped in the setting of priorities for program studies. It will be suggested that an arms-length expert panel can serve as an effective intermediary between an organization and its clients, thus increasing the chance that evaluation work is focused on program areas where the benefits from evaluative work would be high.

This article was stimulated by the observation that an international panel of experts mandated to review the overall performance of an organization made several suggestions which radically affected the organization’s subsequent evaluative efforts (Medical Research Council, 1996). One such suggestion was that a particularly troublesome program mechanism should be summarily dropped and replaced with something new. A brief description of the background to that suggestion may help illustrate the impact that the expert panel’s perspective had on the organization’s evaluation agenda.

Prior to the review by an expert panel, the organization had invested considerable effort in the evaluation of a program mechanism that had been delivering support to graduate students for several years. A staff committee of program managers and evaluation advisors had, over a period of about six months, developed and communicated a

framework and plan for evaluating the mechanism. External evaluation advisors (academic administrators and representatives of student societies) had been appointed. While the staff committee was aware that the program mechanism was highly unpopular with some in the client community, the organization's management and board had taken the position that the mechanism should remain in place until program outcomes could be assessed. Expenditure of significant resources for a process evaluation, followed later by an outcomes study, could be predicted. Likewise, ongoing friction with the client community could be anticipated. A termination of the program thus meant that extensive effort which would have gone into both evaluative study and managers' continuing defence of the unpopular mechanism could be redirected to more productive activity, such as designing a replacement mechanism.

Upon receiving the recommendation of the expert panel, the organization reversed its decision to maintain the program mechanism until an outcomes study could be carried out. The program was replaced. One interpretation of the organization's response is that it was able to appreciate the depth of the community's concern with the program mechanism only when that concern was distilled and communicated by a highly credible third party. In that interpretation, to be explored in this article, the expert panel functions much like a communications satellite, receiving and condensing signals from external stakeholders then reflecting them down to the organization.

The characteristics of the expert panel and the organizational review were as follows. First, the panel's seven members had high credibility with senior management and the client community. They could be considered as respected peers by the organization's CEO and as broad-thinking judges by other stakeholders. Second, panel members were highly knowledgeable in the organizations's area of operation. They could thus rapidly familiarize themselves with the organization's programming and easily appreciate its functioning in the external environment. Third, the panel had a very broad mandate to review the organization's performance against objectives and to suggest ways in which performance might be enhanced. It was not specifically asked to consider priorities for evaluative work. The expert panel described in this article should thus not be confused with ongoing committees that advise on evaluation and review. Fourth, the panel was provided with extensive stakeholder input: e-mail and letters from any program beneficiary (or potential beneficiary) who wanted to be heard, results of Internet-based discussions

on specific program issues, written submissions from a wide range of related societies and organizations, program data, and a self-assessment by the management of the organization. The panel also interviewed representatives of most internal and external stakeholder groups.

RELATED LITERATURE

Not surprisingly, the literature on program evaluation tends to focus on what transpires after a decision to evaluate has been made. While there is extensive writing about the front end of program evaluation, covering areas such as evaluability assessment (Casebeer & Thurston, 1995; Corbeil, 1989, 1992; Rutman, 1980) and issue identification (Watson, 1990), there is relatively little written about how evaluation priorities are set. Winberg (1986) discusses the merits of a phased approach to evaluations that allows decision-makers to forego later stages of an evaluation in the event that information provided in earlier stages meets their requirements and, as mentioned earlier, Motuz (1992) has written about fixed schedule evaluation planning. However, it is worth noting that Motuz cites only government documents, reinforcing an impression that there is no surfeit of articles on evaluation priority setting. The management literature (e.g., Rowe, Mason, & Dickel, 1987) covers strategic planning well but evaluation planning does not figure prominently.

While organizations may set up channels for program users to communicate opinions about programming once an evaluation has been decided upon (O'Brecht, 1992), formal channels to bring stakeholder concerns to bear upon evaluation priority setting appear less common. As Peach and Hirst (1989) suggest, a mechanism that involves large numbers of participants (as does an extensive gathering of program feedback information) will be costly and slow, thus potentially inhibiting an organization's ability to react quickly when needs for evaluative work become evident. Cost and complexity would appear to mitigate against frequent use of an expert panel. However, the payoff from occasional use in terms of more effective deployment of limited evaluation resources may well make the use of an expert panel worthwhile. Love (1993) draws attention to what Dunn (1982) called "Type III" errors, described as asking the wrong questions, contaminating the evaluation with organizational or personal bias, or even solving the right problem at the wrong time. Any mechanism that can minimize displaced evaluation effort warrants close consideration.

An expert panel that is fully open to input from interested stakeholders and has a good grasp of issues meets the two criteria that Watson (1990) has set out for the selection of evaluation issues: legitimacy and competence. Watson defines legitimacy as “a matter of the stakeholders in the program having a voice in issue selection appropriate to their ‘stake’” (p. 16). Competence he defines contextually as “the ability to recognize the issues that are essential to achieving the primary stakeholder interests” (p. 16). A small panel of highly competent people exposed to extensive and intensive communication from stakeholders is in an excellent position to advise on evaluation priorities.

An expert panel brings a large measure of objectivity to consideration of program issues. As Aucoin (1987) writes, in describing the merits of Royal Commissions and task forces, “they are able to achieve a greater degree of objectivity than on-going organizations including external advisory agencies can maintain, given the latter’s vested interest in the credibility of the record of the policy advice they render” (p. 5). Using Mintzberg’s (1979) term, “temporary adhocracies,” to emphasize the distinction between the task forces that he is discussing and those that may be embedded in a larger organization, Aucoin points out that they have a high degree of “horizontal specialization (as compared to vertical specialization) ... a greater emphasis on substantive policy expertise (as opposed to administrative experience) [and] a greater reliance on liaison devices and internal communications (as opposed to highly structured planning and control systems)” (p. 5). The breadth, depth, and extensive input base of an expert panel suggests a fit with Aucoin’s characterization of an effective task force.

A further advantage of using an expert panel to provide advice on evaluation priorities lies in its members’ capacity to view the organization in a broader perspective. Jorjani (1994) points out the merits of what he calls “a holistic perspective” to the evaluation of public programs, that is, a consideration of programs as key components in the maintenance of social welfare. In a similar vein, various authors (Myers, 1992; Rowe & Jacobs, 1998) espouse the benefits of a “systems approach” to evaluation, one that involves recognition of the dynamic nature of programs and the complex environments in which they are embedded. A group of advisors that is neither directly involved in the function of an organization nor potential beneficiaries of the organization’s programs are in a good position to perceive in overview the social, economic, political, and biophysi-

cal environments in which those programs function. The importance of recognizing the political anchorage of programs has been emphasized by Cabatoff (1996) and Knox (1996), drawing on the writings of Weiss (1975) and Palumbo (1987).

Thurston (1990), in an article on the decision-making process and decision theory, provides additional insight into why an organization might want to explore all possible channels to ensure input from stakeholders in setting priorities. He relays a quote from Collingridge (1982): "A successful organization may be said to be a responsive one, because it encourages criticism of its objectives and operations and because it maintains the ability to respond to criticism which hits its target by favouring decisions which are flexible" (p. 40). By focusing on the fundamentals of decision-making, Thurston also helps us understand why officers within an organization may be less well positioned than an outside group to fully receive and absorb the messages of external stakeholders. He begins by explaining that fundamentally the phases of a decision process are: identify the problem, search for information, generate solutions, compare solutions, choose solution, execute solution, and evaluate consequences. As Thurston points out, even this apparently simple representation rapidly develops complexity as one realizes that "[1] each stage may require application of the full process, [2] there may be overlap of phases or [3] there may be occasions when it is necessary to return to an earlier phase" (p. 30). When a staff officer in an organization receives a written complaint about a program, he or she will, in preparing a reply, engage the decision process. Frequently, the underlying problem will be identified as a lack of understanding about the program on the part of the critic. A logical solution is to explain and justify the program mechanism. When, in the future, the officer receives a similar complaint, she or he is likely to take shortcuts to simplify the decision-making process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

In responding to a second, similar complaint or criticism of a program, the officer's decision-making shortcut process may portray the second complaint as belonging to a class of complaints of which the two are *representative*. It is also reasonable to expect that the officer's first response may provide an *anchor* or base for development of the second. Over time, the response decision may become automatic, decreasing the chance that criticism will be seen as an indicator of need for evaluative study.

Of course, members of an expert panel are as likely as anyone else to base their decision making on past experience. The difference between their decision making and that of staff officers is that they would view complaints in a more detached way, as information rather than work and as viewpoints rather than threats. Also, by receiving critiques en masse, rather than sequentially over a protracted period, the panel is more likely to see patterns and be able to identify varying levels of stakeholder concern among a variety of program issues.

One further fact mentioned by Thurston (1990) helps in understanding the value of the perspective provided by an expert panel. He writes:

Research has shown that people repeatedly make choices other than the outcome representing maximum utility: responses to losses are more extreme than responses to gains, and the displeasure associated with losing a sum of money is generally greater than the pleasure of gaining the same amount. (p. 36)

If a staff officer has been involved in the design, implementation, or operation of a program mechanism, he or she is likely to perceive critical comment on the mechanism as a loss rather than a gain. Her or his response is thus potentially not one that will maximize benefits over the long term. In contrast, a member of an expert panel who has no personal involvement in a program may be better positioned for dispassionate assessment of information.

In an article about the importance of an organization “unlearning” old perspectives when new ones are introduced, Cabatoff (1997) offers ideas that help illustrate the difference between the views of staff officers in an organization and the views of members of an expert panel examining the organization’s performance at arms length. In discussing what other authors have referred to as “routinization” of organizational practices or the organization’s “automatic pilot,” Cabatoff writes:

Precisely because of the “unconscious” nature of some standard operating procedures, both learning and unlearning may encounter significant obstacles. There is usually conscious awareness of new routines that are being assimilated, but such conscious awareness is of-


ten lacking in the case of routines that exist at the level of reflex. (p. 151)

A system that brings fresh perspectives to bear on an organization helps counteract the narrowed vision that can be an unwanted side effect of routinization.

EXPERT PANEL AS COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE

Figure 1 provides an illustration of the idea that feedback on program issues from stakeholders to members of an organization may

Figure 1. Bypassing Program Feedback Filters



be heavily filtered, whereas feedback reflected by an expert panel may remain closer to its original form. There are undoubtedly a wide variety of filters at play, but it was considered useful to focus attention on two which might help explain the author's observation that signals transmitted via an expert panel prompted beneficial organizational action, whereas signals transmitted directly to members of the organization did not. A first communications barrier, the "stakeholder discretion filter," involves factors that temper the frankness of stakeholder feedback. A second barrier, the "organizational defence filter," includes factors that may serve to screen or transform stakeholder feedback on program performance.

The "stakeholder discretion filter" comes into play as clients weigh the benefits of frank communication about program shortcomings with the potential future cost of weakened relations with the supporting organization. Put bluntly, it is the filter induced by the adage "don't bite the hand that feeds you." Clients who would like to benefit from the organization in some way in the future may temper criticism to avoid jeopardizing their potential to receive future benefits. This reticence may be expected even if, in practice, decisions on the distribution of program resources are virtually independent of a stakeholder's past communications with the organization. External stakeholders may not be aware of the internal controls that ensure present criticism will not affect their chances of obtaining future support. Good sense, too, dictates that even if such controls are in place, clients would be wise to be discrete. One never knows where a critical communication may end up or how it might have a negative impact indirectly, for example, if inadvertently introduced into a wider network by a program officer in conversation. Discretion, too, may filter feedback from a program client who has been unsuccessful in attempts to benefit from the organization's programs. Such clients may, with some justification, assume that negative feedback from them on the program may be discounted by officials as "simply sour grapes." Finally, program clients may be less likely to provide feedback to an organization, often perceived as a faceless entity, than to a named panel of individuals specifically mandated with the task of reviewing the organization..

It is not common practice for the funders of an organization to provide critical feedback on program mechanisms, possibly because representatives of the funding organization are not usually versed in program detail. For example, officers in a federal or provincial government treasury are unlikely to understand the detailed function-

ing of programs in specific branches and agencies. Thus discretion may serve as a filter for their feedback, even on program performance at the macro level. However, if they are invited to provide comments to an expert panel, that filter may be bypassed, allowing the organization important insight into the thinking of a major stakeholder. Likewise, it might appear inappropriate for other bodies (societies, professional bodies, associations, etc.) to spontaneously prepare a corporate assessment of another organization, but quite appropriate for them to respond to an invitation to provide an assessment to a third party.

Obviously much useful program feedback will not be held back by the stakeholder discretion filter. If someone feels strongly that a program is not functioning well, they will want to make themselves heard. But their message then encounters what may be an even denser barrier, the “organizational defence filter.” The idea is simple. A first reflex of most members of an organization will be to deflect criticism. For executives and program staff, who all have a direct interest in preserving the organization, an initial response to negative feedback (positive feedback is rare it seems) is rebuttal. Responses may focus on explaining the program or delivering a counter-argument to place individuals or the organization in a positive light. In essence, the feedback is returned, transformed, rather than being added to a pool of information useful for setting study priorities.

Obtaining Stakeholder Feedback Through an Expert Panel

HOW

assemble a panel of individuals at arms length from the organization who:

- **understand the organization, its programs and its environment**
- **have the trust and respect of the CEO and are credible to stakeholder groups**

provide the panel with unfettered feedback from stakeholders on their perception on performance of the organization and its programs

WHY

the organization obtains distilled, anonymous feedback from stakeholders that is inclusive and balanced

identifies areas for program improvement

receives useful input for deciding organizational strategies, evaluation included

Some members of the organization, particularly those serving on the board or client-focused committees may be more inclined to view negative feedback as useful to the organization but they will also be less likely to encounter it on a daily basis. One would expect that evaluation specialists and other advisors within the organization might likewise be less defensive about negative comments and, if they have regular exposure to such feedback, might be able to use it in developing an evaluation agenda. However, in many organizations, evaluation advisors will be off-line and hence not aware of day-to-day input from external stakeholders. Further, evaluation advisors are not necessarily well-positioned to formulate evaluation priorities. An enthusiastic evaluation advisor can find a reason to evaluate anything, whereas a more cynical one can find reasons for investing effort only in studies where there is intense interest and likely use of results. In the author's view, an organization's CEO needs to be directly involved in the development of study priorities, and an effective way to ensure that engagement is to provide him or her with program feedback delivered through a panel of peers.

DISCUSSION

When the ideas behind this article were presented at the 1998 Conference of the Canadian Evaluation Society, audience feedback indicated that the setting of evaluative priorities within an organization is indeed difficult. Differing roles and perspectives on programs, differing personalities and attitudes, all conspire against a calm, reasoned review of available stakeholder feedback about what requires study. Several participants at the conference commented that it was useful to recognize that evaluation advisors may be in conflict of interest when considering evaluation priorities, much as a garage operator may not be entirely detached when identifying which systems in a client's car require examination. The idea of a special channel for providing documented and unfiltered stakeholder feedback to the organization was not questioned. However, some concern was expressed about the use of expert panels comprised of the CEO's peers. If members of the panel attach more significance to the views of the CEO than to those of other stakeholders, the chance of the organization receiving fresh, objective advice is obviously lessened. This consideration points out the critical importance of panel creation. Panel members must be people who the CEO trusts deeply and respects highly, but they must also be people who have a strong ability to view all information objectively. The chair of the panel must be outstandingly astute, experienced, diplomatic, prac-

tical, and firm. Such people are likely to have their time booked well into the future, implying that organizing an expert panel requires advance planning.

Reviewers of a first draft of this article, whose comments were greatly appreciated, pointed out that the expert panel's identification of evaluation priorities was, in the case reported, a spin-off from the organizational review. One reviewer suggested that the article should instead focus on the merits of using an expert panel to provide an overview of organizational performance. These are valid comments, but it remains the author's view that the use of expert panels to assess organizational performance, long-recognized as appropriate for academic accreditation, peer review of research programs, and so forth, is a much larger topic. The intent of this article is to focus on one observation that may be of particular interest to readers involved in setting evaluation priorities. That said, the reviewers' comments do evoke the question: Is there a simpler way of providing the organization, particularly the CEO, with credible, unfiltered feedback from stakeholders? One lower key approach might be for the CEO to identify a particular individual, again someone who has her or his trust and respect, to consult stakeholders about program performance. There would be disadvantages to such an arrangement (less visible, less open, decreased legitimacy, more susceptibility to interpersonal static) but it would be faster and less expensive than full consultation with the stakeholder community by an expert panel. The ideas in this paper would also suggest that members of an organization might profitably look for opportunities to obtain frank stakeholder feedback in situations, social settings for example, in which defence of the program or organization is not expected.

CONCLUSION

A practical observation, a literature review, and a theoretical model have been presented to stimulate thinking about the merits of an organization using an external, arms-length, highly credible expert panel to obtain and analyse unfiltered feedback from stakeholders on program performance. While the observation about changed evaluation priorities stemmed from an extensive stakeholder feedback exercise that spanned six months and occupied an expert panel for a week, useful feedback could presumably be obtained with a smaller expenditure of effort. The program evaluation literature examined by the author generally supports the idea that an external panel could provide an organization with new insight on priorities for program studies.

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